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Abstract 
 
 
Recently, the issue of federalism has turned at the centre of the political debate in Italy. It is basically 
due to the growing demand of rich northern regions who in 2018 laid down the requests to exercise 
additional functions retaining a more significant part of revenues that the central government collects 
in their territories. Another reason for attention to this issue is that the long period of public finance 
consolidation in Italy (2011-15) put the implementation of fiscal federalism to a standstill. There is a 
growing demand to ascertain the measure to which this implementation has been biased o remained 
undone. This paper focuses on this second issue investigating to which extent the design of fiscal 
federalism reform has been applied to the Italian municipalities with a special focus on the 
equalization system. The paper first proposes a review on the evolution of public finance setting in 
Italy before the crisis (2008-09), considering the decentralization process in the 1990s and the 
Constitutional reform of 2001 followed by the enabling law 42 in 2009. Then it looks at the period of 
fiscal consolidation after the financial crisis in 2011 focusing on the burden of adjustment measures 
imposed to Italian municipalities. Finally, it tries to summarize the contradictions that the overlapping 
of two contrasting political agendas – the centralization of public finance under fiscal consolidation 
and the ongoing fiscal federalism reform – created for the equalization system of municipalities. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Nei mesi scorsi la questione del federalismo fiscale è tornata al centro del dibattito politico italiano, 
a seguito del rinnovato interesse verso questo tema da parte di alcune Regioni settentrionali, che 
hanno manifestato la volontà di esercitare direttamente una serie di funzioni fin qui amministrate 
dall’Amministrazione centrale, finanziando questo surplus di attività tramite quota parte di entrate 
che lo Stato attualmente preleva sui rispettivi territori di riferimento. Sul piano più strettamente 
scientifico, invece, la necessità di riportare la questione del federalismo fiscale al centro dell’analisi 
è dovuta al fatto che il lungo periodo di consolidamento delle finanze pubbliche italiane (2011-2015), 
determinatosi in ragione della crisi economica e finanziaria attraversata dal Paese, ha portato la 
riforma federalista ad un punto di sostanziale stasi. Per tale motivo è cresciuto l’interesse nel 
verificare se l’applicazione del federalismo fiscale sia stata parziale o abbia comunque preso forme 
differenti rispetto al disegno originario. L’analisi condotta in questo articolo muove da questo 
secondo aspetto, esaminando in particolare se e in qual misura il disegno della legge delega n. 42 del 
2009 sia stato disatteso nei confronti dei Comuni Italiani con riferimento al sistema perequativo fin 
qui implementato. Il presente lavoro propone, nella prima parte, una revisione dell’evoluzione 
dell’assetto della finanza pubblica italiana prima della crisi (2008-09), considerando il processo di 
decentralizzazione degli anni ’90 e la riforma costituzionale del 2001, successivamente seguita dalla 
legge delega n. 42 del 2009. In seguito, si considera il periodo di consolidamento fiscale intervenuto 
dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2011, concentrandosi sul peso della manovra a carico del comparto 
comunale. Infine, si cerca di fare una sintesi delle contradizioni che le due agende politiche 
contrastanti – la centralizzazione della finanza pubblica a seguito della manovra e il procedere in 
contemporanea dell’implementazione della riforma federalista – hanno prodotto per il sistema 
perequativo comunale.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Federalism is a complex phenomenon. The models of federalism adopted internationally differ, in 
some cases significantly, in function of institutional, political and historical context. The Italian 
federalism design develops in the polycentric institutional system in which aside the regions there are 
present local authorities – municipalities, provinces and metropolitan cities – whose position, 
structure and core functions are safeguarded by the constitutional provisions. The distribution of 
authority and functions between different levels government is built on the principle of subsidiarity, 
differentiation and adequacy. 
Besides the delicate polycentric institutional setting the recent history of public finance has also 
contributed to determine the design of Italian federalism. In order to understand it, it can be useful to 
give an overview on recent developments in the organization of public finance in Italy. Its essential 
steps consist in: 
• almost total centralization of the fiscal authority in the early 1970s 
• decentralization 1997-2000 
• constitutional reform in favour of federalism 2001 and enabling law 42/2009 
• centralization of public finance under fiscal adjustment 2011-15. 
The period between 1971 and 1977 is characterized by almost total centralization of public 
finance in Italy by means of the Tax Reform Act of 19716 and of the so-called Decrees Stammati 
(1976 and 1977). Under the centralized scheme, almost all local taxes were replaced with transfers 
from the centre to the periphery. The system with centralized tax collection and decentralized 
expenditure aimed, on one hand, to reduce the gap between the North and the South of the country in 
provision of local services and, on the other hand, to keep under control public spending.  
The centralization resulted in the system of relations between the national and territorial 
governments, characterized by asymmetry between power to tax and spend, in which the centre, 
collecting taxes, was considered always ‘guilty’. Furthermore, during the 1980s, the Italian 
government lost control over public finances, both at national and territorial level, which resulted in 
an increase of the public debt over 100% of the debt/GDP ratio. In 1992, Italy experienced a strong 
currency devaluation leaving the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Both the resulted financial 
 
6
 Legislative Delegation to the Government of the Republic for Tax Reform. 
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crisis and lately the need to meet the Maastricht requirements to join the common currency in 1997 
called for the strong fiscal consolidation. 
Between 1997-2001 there was observed a strong movement versus decentralization, believed 
useful to increase financial responsibility of territorial governments (Ambrosanio and Bordignon, 
2007; Ambrosanio et.al, 2010). It was preceded with the introduction of municipal tax on real estate 
property ICI in 1992. By means of the Bassanini laws, the vast administrative functions and skills 
were transferred from the centre to the periphery. In short run, the decentralization contributed to 
further increase the system of transfers since the new peripheric functions were financed with 
additional resources coming from the centre (Rodean, 2012). 
In 2001, there were adopted changes to the Title V of the Constitution to move the country 
versus federalist model. Coherently with the international trend, it was believed that fiscal federalism 
can be a remedy for the growing public debt. Providing territorial governments with power to tax and 
spend it was believed to enhance their accountability to local communities and to stabilize the 
growing public debt. 
The constitutional reform called for a significant change in the existing relations between the 
centre and the regions. According to the art.117 of the new Title V, the state (the national parliament 
and, in the cases explicitly provided by law, the national government) retained the power to 
exclusively legislate on a limited subset of functions (defence, justice, public order, currency, 
international treaties, setting uniform standards and levels for the provision of fundamental/essential 
public services by regions and local authorities etc.), while all other functions were either reserved to 
regional legislation (exclusive regional legislation) or to be shared between the state and the regions 
(concurrent legislation) for which the first one should limitedly fix priorities/principles allowing the 
regions to legislate on details.  
The new art. 119 of the Constitution describes the new fiscal relations between different levels 
of government. It establishes that regional and local authorities’ functions should be financed totally 
with their own revenues, tax shares and with equalization transfers. The equalization system, to be 
instituted by the state, should benefit the territories with weaker fiscal capacity.  
In 2009, there was approved the enabling law n. 42 which laid down the principles and criteria 
for implementation of the constitutional reform, providing the government with special legislative 
delegation to proceed with the implementation. 
The new set of economic and financial relations between the centre and the territorial 
autonomies (regions, provinces, municipalities and metropolitan cities) aims to overcome the derived 
finance system (finanza derivata), in which the distribution of resources occurred according to the 
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historical levels of expenditure (spesa storica), by providing them with high levels of autonomy in 
taxing and spending safeguarding the principles of solidarity and social cohesion. 
The resources for local governments (municipalities) according the law should come from their 
own taxes, tax shares and equalization transfers. Standard expenditure needs (fabbisogni standard) 
are to be considered as a benchmark for financing local governments through equalization system. 
To this end, the law distinguishes between local fundamental functions, for which it specifies full 
financing of standard expenditure needs, and the remaining local functions, for which it provides for 
partial equalization in fiscal capacity only. For the fundamental functions relating to civil and social 
rights, the state defines the essential levels of benefits (livelli essenziali di prestazioni) to guarantee 
throughout the national territory. 
The law 42/2009 further mandates to set mechanisms of rewarding efficient local governments 
meeting targets and of sanctioning otherwise. The targets are to be established in terms of balanced 
budgets, provision of essential levels of benefits, low levels of fiscal pressure and increased 
employment. 
The implementation of the law 42/2009 should be consistent with the financial commitments 
of Italy under the European Stability and Growth Pact. It should avoid duplication of functions and 
costs between different levels of government, safeguard the principle of progressivity in taxation and 
not increase overall tax burden. 
The economic crisis between 2008-09 and lately the financial crisis (2011-12) hit severely the 
Italian economy and called into question the sustainability of its public debt. To regain confidence of 
financial markets, the central government in 2011 launched a massive fiscal adjustment program. In 
2012, the Parliament voted to insert the budget balance principle in the Italian Constitution though it 
was not strictly required for the implementation of the Fiscal compact and Six Pack. Probably the 
ruling political coalition wanted in this way to bring to the attention of people the importance of 
balanced public budget and to take a strong commitment not to further increase public debt.  
The measures of public consolidation in the period 2011-15, involved all levels of government, 
especially the local ones versus whom the central government undertook actions that some call as 
justifiable only «[…] by a perceived situation of extreme risk for the country, analogous to an 
international conflict» (Ambrosanio et. al, 2016). Among the principal measures introduced there 
were cuts in transfers, forced saving by means of the Internal stability pact (ISP), limitations of 
expenditure and borrowing, block of turnover etc.  
In the same period there was registered a significant increase in tax autonomy of the 
municipalities. The increased autonomy, realized through extending municipal taxation of real estate, 
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was however a result of using local taxation to collect additional resources for national budget rather 
than an outcome of the fiscal federalism reform.  
The centralization of public finance 2011-15 put de facto the fiscal federalism in standstill 
situation in which the reforms were nominally going on but without moving institutional setting 
versus federalist paradigm. In 2015 there was taken an attempt to consolidate de jure the new 
centralized setting with a proposal of the constitutional reform under the Renzi’s government. This 
reform was rejected by the referendum in 2016 and now it is observed an opposite movement: a 
growing demand of regions to run autonomously additional functions and an increasing demand of 
local authorities (municipalities, provinces and metropolitan cities) to overcome the negative 
consequences of restrictive policies, to revise the chaotic implementation process of fiscal federalism 
reconciling its principles with the rules of coordination of public finance deriving from the balanced 
budget rule. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the main measures 
applied to municipalities under the fiscal consolidation 2010-15. The second section considers their 
effects on municipalities finance. The third section analyses how the restrictive policies contributed 
to shape the equalization program for municipalities in deviation from the original design in the law 
42/2009. The fourth part concludes offering some policy indications.  
The analysis and data in this paper does not consider the municipalities from the regions Val 
d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige as they are not subject to the direct control 
of the central government authorities. The part of the paper that regards the equalization program 
adopted to Italian municipalities does not also consider the municipalities of Sicily and Sardinia to 
which is not applied 
 
1. Municipal federalism under fiscal consolidation 
 
 
The implementation of fiscal federalism after the enabling law 42/2009 coincides with the period 
during which Italy suffers recession following the economic (2008-09) and the financial crisis in 
2011. The negative impact of these two shocks on real economy is dramatic: the Italian GDP 
contraction is -5.9% in 2009 and -2.6% in 2013. 
The central government, given the huge public debt, did not adopt countercyclical fiscal policy 
(Ambrosanio and Balduzzi, 2013). In contrast, to regain the trust of financial markets versus Italian 
public debt, the government launched the fiscal consolidation program, mostly concentrated in 2011-
13, which measures consisted in almost 56 euro billions of additional fiscal revenues, 46 euro billions 
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of current expenditure reduction7 and 20 euro billions of capital expenditures cut8. In 2012, the reform 
of the public pension system was adopted. It was expected to produce significant adjustments for 
public finance in medium-long period. 
The fiscal consolidation involved all levels of government. For the municipalities, the bulk of 
burden consisted in reductions of transfers, introduction of new fiscal rules with heavy sanctions in 
case of their breaking (ISP and balanced budget), borrowing and expenditure limits and in block of 
turnover. 
In the period 2011-15, the cuts of the central government transfers to municipalities ammounted 
to about 8,5 euro billions (Table 1) given that the total local current spending was equal to 51 euro 
bilions in 2010. The transfers reductions were provided through different normative acts (see Transfer 
cuts, Table 1) and realized using different criteria. Furthermore, there were differences in trasfers cuts 
timing depending on the municipalities’ population. 
Table 1 Annual and cumulative financial effects of fiscal consolidation program for 
municipalities. Transfers cuts and ISP/budget balance constrains to spending, 2011-18 (euro millions)  
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Cumulative  2011-2018 
Total effects of fiscal consolidation program 3095 4100 3416 158 1003 -539 802 408 12443 
of which ISP and new accounting rules  1509 1522 1261 -448 -637 -621 712 408 3706 
of which transfer cuts 1586 2578 2154 606 1640 82 90 0 8737 
"Costi della politica" Law n.244/2007  86 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 118 
D.L. 78/2010 1500 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2500 
D.L. 201/2011   1450 0 0 0 0 0 0 1450 
D.L. 95/2012   96 2154 250 100 0 0 0 2600 
D.L.179/2012     0 120 0 0 0 0 120 
IMU-Tasi*       -139 152 82 90 0 185 
D.L. 66/2014       376 188 0 0 0 563 
Budget Law 2015         1200 0 0 0 1200 
*With the introduction of TASI and the exclusion of main residence from IMU some local governments were losing tax proceeds 
(about 485euro millions). To compensate them, the specific compensation transfer was introduced to respect the invariance of 
resources. In 2014 it was about 624euro billions and was gradually declining to the level of 300euro millions in 2018. In the Table 
IMU-TASI indicates the difference between the estimate and the compensation transfer in contrast with the principle of the invariance 
of revenues. 
Source: Elaborations based on the local spending and transfers 2011-18, Ministero dell’Interno. 
 
The Internal stability pact was introduced for municipalities, as for regions and provinces, in 
1999 following the commitments of Italy under the European Stability and Growth Pact. The budget 
bill 2016-18 substituted it from 2016 with the balanced budget rules. Though the new rules represent 
an important pass to overcome the restrictive budget stance under the ISP, partially relaxed in 2014-
15, they continue to limit strongly the spending capacity of local governments even in the after-crisis 
 
7
 The expenditure constraint under the Internal Stability Pact are considered as a reduction in current expenditures.  
8
 COPAFF First Report 2014, “Condivisione tra i livelli di governo dei dati sull’ entità e la ripartizione delle misure di 
consolidamento della finanza pubblica.  Available on http://www.mef.gov.it/ministero/commissioni/copaff/ 
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period by blocking portions of the accrual resources to the provisions for bad debts (see ISP and new 
accounting rules 2017-18 in Table 1) . 
The ISP rules originally were intended as an instrument to ensure financial responsibility of 
local governments, but during the fiscal consolidation they were used to constrain local governments 
to accumulate resources (surplus) to benefit the national budget. In the period 2011-15, the 
municipalities, limiting their expenditure, have cumulatively produced about 3207euro millions of 
surplus (ISP and new accounting rules 2011-15 Table 1). Furthermore, the rules of the Pact, including 
targets, sanctions, monitoring procedures and incentives, being at the core of continuous political 
bargaining, changed almost every year contributing to uncertainty under which local government had 
to operate. 
Starting in 2007, public authority offices were severely limited to hire workers on a permanent 
contractual regime under the so-called block of turnover. Due to these limitations, between 2010-17, 
municipalities lost about 60.000 of employees9 decreasing their employment expenditure by 16% 
(Figure 1). The slight increase in the employment expenditure in 2018 is associated with extra 
spending to finance general revising of public employment contract occurred in 2018. It is important 
to consider that the block of turnover hit local governments in the period when the important reforms 
(budget harmonization and new procurement procedures) were in course requiring high level of 
expertise and numerous activities to comply with the law. Furthermore, during the crisis and in the 
post-crisis period there was an increasing demand for socio-economic services of municipalities 
(Pedaci et al., 2020). 
Figure 1 - Employment expenditure of municipalities 2010-18 (accrual, euro millions) 
 
Source: Elaborations based on the data from the municipalities’ budgets 2010-18, Ministero dell’Interno 
 
9
 The data is based on elaborations of the data from the Conto annuale della RGS Ragioneria generale dello Stato. 
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Several reforms were adopted between 2011-13, seemingly a part of the fiscal federalism 
implementation, which aimed at making municipalities able to collect additional resources for the 
national budget They mainly regarded local taxation and transfers.  
In 2011, as a part of the implementation of the law 42/2009, the government passed the decree 
(D.lgs 23/2011) to introduce from 2014 a new real estate local tax, called IMU in substitution of the 
previous real estate tax ICI10. The IMU could not be levied on main residence of taxpayers. Its legal 
tax rate was fixed at 0.76% with the possibility to vary it between 0.46% and 1.06%. Local 
governments could deliberate to introduce tax allowances for some cadastral categories of buildings. 
The decree (D.lgs 23/2011) provided for fiscalizzazione of the central government fiscal 
transfers to municipalities. This term means that the transfers, permanent and not earmarked to 
financing special projects/programs, were to be abolished and substituted with the transfers coming 
from the newly established state fund, fondo sperimentale di riequilibrio (FSR), of the equal 
amount11. Though the decree specified different criteria for the fund distribution, including standard 
expenditure needs, in 2011 its distribution ensured local authorities the resources equal to the 
abolished transfers.  
The reform designed by the D.lgs 23/2011 regarding municipal taxation never took place. In 
2012 the government, to counter the negative consequences of the financial crisis in Europe, 
anticipated the introduction of IMU and substantially changed it (D.L. 201/2012): the IMU tax base 
was almost doubled by revaluating in linear way cadastral values; the tax base included main 
residence of taxpayers at the legal tax rate fixed at 0.4% with the possibility to vary it 0.2%12. For all 
other buildings, the legal tax rate was 0.76%. 
Being the tax base extended and the cadastral values increased, in 2012 the proceeds from IMU 
were much higher compared to ICI. The netting of this extra income was realized first through gaining 
by the state of the proceeds from all types of buildings at the rate of 0.38% except those from the 
main residence that remained fully of local competence, and secondly, through the reduction of 
resources distributed with the FSR. The distribution of the fund in 2012 was done to ensure the 
invariance of resources in transition from ICI to IMU. 
In 2013, the rules changed again. All proceeds from IMU have become competence of the 
municipalities except those from the buildings of industrial and commercial destination13 whose 
 
10
 The municipal tax on real estate property ICI was introduced in 1992. Its tax base is computed on the cadastre values. In 2008, ICI 
was reformed by excluding main residence from tax base.  
11 The fund resources were netted however for the transfer cuts imposed by the central government in 2011 (see transfer cuts in Table 
1). 
12
 There was introduced a fiscal deduction of 200 euro on the main residence tax (plus an additional 50 euro for any conniving child 
younger than 26 years old up to a maximum number of eight children). 
13 Building of industrial and commercial destination included in cadastral category D. 
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proceeds at the legal tax rate (0.76%) went to the state and whose extra tax levy revenues went to the 
municipalities.  
In the same year, the FSR was abolished and substituted with a temporary fund, fondo di 
solidarietà comunale (FSC). Apparently, nothing changed for municipalities as all variations were 
implemented under the invariance of resources principle, which however were decreasing annually 
by means of transfer cuts (see transfer cuts in 2013 Table 1). The new fund functioning was, however, 
very different if compared to the FSR. In the new fund, for each municipality there were determined 
the standard capacity of IMU, equal to this tax proceeds at the legal rate (0.76%) and the fund standard 
resources, equal to the sum of revenues from the abolished ICI tax and FSR transfers14. While the 
FSR was fully vertical fund, filled with the central government resources, the FSC was designed to 
redistribute income coming from local IMU in order to insure the invariance of fund resources in the 
transition from ICI to IMU.15  
In particular, for the functioning of FSC, local governments were preliminary subtracted the 
38.23%16 of their IMU standard revenues to feed the fund (quota di alimentazione). Each 
municipality’s FSC transfer was calculated as follows:  𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  0.3823𝐼𝑀𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the fund standard resources and 𝐼𝑀𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the standard revenue of IMU. The FSC 
in 2013 was partially horizontal fund, filled with the state resources (about 2807euro billions) and the 
local IMU revenues at the standard tax rate (4717euro billions). Its distribution mechanism consisted 
in the refund of 38.23% of 𝐼𝑀𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡 ‘corrected’ for the gap between 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐼𝑀𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡. With 
decreasing of the fund resources (𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖,𝑡) by means of the transfer cuts (Table 1), the fund in 2015 
became fully horizontal with about 300euro millions of local IMU revenues outsourced to the national 
budget. 
The transition of the state’s share in IMU from the revenues on all buildings at 0.38% rate to 
the revenues from buildings of industrial and commercial destination increased the tax base under 
levy of local governments compared to 2013. The extra resources, calculated at legal/standard rate, 
were outsourced to the central budget by respectively decreasing the fund resources of the FSC. 
In 2013, the parliament voted another reform. Starting in 2014 there would be instituted a single 
municipal tax (IUC), composed of three parts: 1) IMU, levied only on land and buildings different 
from the main residence; 2) TARI, a service tax to finance waste collection service, 3) TASI, a service 
 
14
 The FSR transfers were equal to the state transfers fiscalizzati under D.lgs 23/2011, diminished to account for the transfer cuts 
meanwhile applied. 
15
 From 2013-14, the FSC included a part of the State resources (vertical component) which however was erased under the transfer 
cuts applied to the fund resources.  
16 From 2016 this percentage has been set at 22,43%. 
11 
 
tax to finance all the other indivisible services provided by the municipality with tax base is the same 
as of IMU, but comprehensive of main residence17. Within the same reform, the main residence was 
excluded from the tax base of IMU and included in the tax base of TASI, which is the same of IMU.  
The municipalities promptly responded to the TASI introduction by extracting from it the revenues 
that they had lost on IMU. This kind of tax manipulation could hardly respond to any reason different 
from the political consensus seeking. In 2016, main residence of taxpayers was excluded from the tax 
base of TASI as well. The respective revenues were substituted with the transfer from the FSC, 
equally increased. On the same time, municipalities were blocked the possibility to raise rates on all 
local taxes, excluded TARI which revenues are earmarked to financing fully the local waste 
management service. 
Furthermore, the reform provided that from 2014 the FSC was becoming a permanent fund. 
Starting in 2015 until nowadays, the FSC transfers have been calculated considering in part local 
standard expenditure needs and fiscal capacities with explicit reference to the application of the fiscal 
federalism according to the law 42/2009.  
The system of equalizations transfers developed within FSC is quite different from the 
equalization design described in the enabling law. The next sections provide more details on the 
deviations of the current equalization system for the municipalities form the original design provided 
in the enabling law 42/2009. 
 
2. Effect of the fiscal consolidation on finance of local governments 
 
 
The measures of fiscal consolidation were not ending in themselves and produced the effects on 
municipalities economy and finance. In the period there was observed, mainly due to the limitations 
and accounting rules of the ISP, a dramatic contraction in the local investments (Ambrosanio, 
Balduzzi and Bordignon, 2014). The total local current spending in contrast has increased (Table 2)18. 
The levels of expenditure for almost all principal local functions in 2017 compared to the 2010 are 
lower except for the local transport and viability and urban territory governing and waste 
management19. It is important to consider that between 2017-18 the local current expenditure retakes 
 
17 The basic tax rate is 0.1%, which could be reduced or even cancelled by local authorities on the different types of buildings. There 
is also a maximum threshold, fixed on 0.25% and an additional requirement that the sum of the IMU tax rate plus the TASI tax rate 
cannot be greater than 1.06%. 
18
 The variations in Table 2 are calculated in nominal terms. The inflation rate in the same period was over 8% annual. 
19 The positive dynamic was, at least in part, due to exogenous to fiscal consolidation factors. First, in the same period there were 
introduced new accounting rules which constrained local governments to consolidate budgets by including off-budget expenditures 
mainly regarding these two functions. Second, spending for waste management was growing due to the law requirements to increase 
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to grow mostly due to the central government financing local welfare programs and to addition 
spending to finance revising of employment contracts (in 2018).  
Table 2 – Current expenditure of local governments, 2010-18 % dynamic. Index 2010=100 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Administration services 100 99 97 102 96 94 93 91 93 
Social services 100 96 93 93 93 92 91 91 95 
Education 100 99 98 98 94 92 89 89 90 
Governing urban territory and waste management 100 109 115 128 130 136 128 128 129 
Local Transport and viability 100 103 110 111 115 113 105 102 102 
Current expenditure 100 101 101 105 103 103 101 100 102 
Current expenditure net of waste management  
and Local Transport Service  100 98 97 99 95 94 93 92 95 
 Source: IFEL (2019) 
The fact that local current spending remained relatively stable despite decreasing transfers can 
be explained considering that, in the same period, there was observed a significant growth in the 
revenues from local taxation. While the central government transfers, including those from FSR and 
lately from FSC, between 2010-17 have decreased by 10.7 euro billions20 (Table 3), the income from 
main local revenues (IMU-TASI, surcharge on IRPEF and tourist tax in 2017 compared to ICI, 
surcharge on electricity consumption, surcharge on IRPEF in 2010) has increased by almost 7.7 euro 
billions21.  
Table 3 – Local resource, transfers and tax revenues under public consolidation, 2010-18 (euro millions) 
    2010 2018 2010-18 
Resources (a) = (b) + (c) 29096 26047 -3238 
Central government transfers* (b) 16011 5087 -10765 
Local tax revenues (c) = (d) +(e) 
+ (f) + (g) 13084 20771 7717 
surcharge electricity consumption (d) 694 0 -694 
surcharge IRPEF  (e) 3109 4717 1553 
ICI-IMU-TASI (f) 9281 15576 3729 
tourist tax (g) 0 479 360 
* From the central government transfers, only those from the Ministero dell’Interno, are subtracted the part of 
IMU revenues that serve to fill the FSC fund and which is refund to the municipalities with the FSC distribution 
(quota di alimentazione). In the municipalities’ budgets (Rendiconto consuntivo) the local proceeds from IMU are 
 
recycling. Not considering the expenditure on local transport and waste management, the total local current expenses decreased in the 
period 2010-17 (see Table 2). 
20 The negative variation of transfers 2010-17 in Table 3 considers transfer cuts as in the specified Table 1, the decreasing of transfers 
due to assigning to municipals of additional tax base in transition from ICI to IMU and  variations in the state transfers not considered 
under fiscalizzazione  (D.lgs 23/2011). 
21 The local tax revenues in Table 3 do not comprise the proceeds from the residual local taxes: the revenues from COSAP and TOSAP 
were equal to 913euro millions, from ICDPA to 454euro millions, and from TARI to 8.883euro million. The municipalities budgets 
2017, Ministero dell’Interno. 
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diminished for this part of IMU which is then accounted in the transfers from the state. Since this income is a part 
of the local IMU tax revenues, in the Table 3 it is considered in ICI-IMU-TASI flow. 
Source: IFEL (2019) 
The growth in local tax revenues combined with decreasing transfers contributed to increase 
significantly tax autonomy of municipalities. The weight of transfers in total revenues22 decreased 
from 30% in 2010 to 9% in 201723, while the weight of local tax revenues grew from 24% to 36% 
(Figure 2). The remaining local revenues, including the proceeds from the residual taxes (different 
from IMU-TASI, IRPEF surcharge and tourist tax), tariffs, fees and extra tax income, has grown as 
well. The driving force underpinning this positive trend was the growing income from TARI tax, 
which revenues are earmarked to financing the local waste management service. 
Figure 2 – Local revenues . 2010-18 (% composition) 
 
*Central administration transfers consider only the transfers from Ministero dell’Interno. 
Source: Elaborations based on the data from the municipalities’ budgets 2010-17, Ministero dell’Interno 
 
22
 Total revenues are equal the sum of the first tree titles of current revenues in municipalities budgets (Rendiconto consuntivo): tax 
revenues, transfers, tax revenues. 
23 The decrease in the share of transfers in total local current revenues would be higher, if the situation in 2010 was compared with 
2015. From 2016, the main residence of taxpayers was excluded from the tax base of TASI and the lost tax revenues were substituted 
with transfers from the FSC, equally increased. Thus, from 2016 the state transfers increase by about 3.6euro billions. 
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The local tax revenues were increasing due to two reasons. The first one was the application of 
new local taxes as IMU, whose tax base is much higher compared to ICI, and tourist tax. The second 
reason relates to the fact that the local governments responded to transfers cuts by moving their tax 
rates to the highest levels. By the end of 2015, the tax rate range under the autonomy of local 
governments has been mainly exploited for the taxes as IMU-TASI and with some residual space for 
the surcharge on IRPEF (Monteduro, 2019). In 2015 the last year before the local governments were 
banned to move their tax rates in 2016, the percentage of municipalities having the residual tax levy 
less than 10% of its maximum possible value was about 52% for IMU-TASI and 30% for the 
surcharge on IRPEF (Table 4). 
Table 4 - Residual tax levy for IMU-TASI and IRPEF surcharge, 2015 
 
 
Source: Elaborations of the Ministero dell’Economia e Finanza (2015) 
The Table 5 shows the share of transfers, lost between 2010-18, that the local governments managed 
to substitute with local revenues (IMU-TASI, surcharge on IRPEF tax and tourist tax) distinguishing 
for size category of municipalities and their area of location. The mean value of such “substitution” 
is about 72% but the degree to which municipalities were able to re-gain transfer cuts varies 
significantly at micro level. It can be seen in the Table 5 that if for the big cities in the North and  
Centre of Italy the positive variation of revenues from the local taxes (2010-18) actually exceeds the 
negative variation in transfers, the cities in the South in the same period have lost a considerable part 
of  resources, their mean “substitution” indicator is almost 30 % percent less than the national value. 
Table 5 – The share of transfer cuts regained through tax levy on the local taxes (IMU-TASI, surcharge on IRPEF 
tax and tourist tax), 2010-18 
Size category of municipalities 
(population) North Central South Total 
<=1.000  68% 56% 32% 56% 
1.001 - 5.000 75% 76% 45% 65% 
N. municipalities % N. municipalities %
[0,10%) 2292 29.83% 3953 51.44%
[10%, 20%) 786 10.23% 1961 25.52%
[20%, 30%) 985 12.82% 1317 17.14%
[30%, 40%) 1011 13.16% 356 4.63%
[40%, 50%) 314 4.09% 59 0.77%
[50%, 60%) 698 9.08% 31 0.40%
[60%, 70%) 242 3.15% 7 0.095
[70%, 80%) 314 4.09%
[80%, 90%) 57 0.74%
[90%, 100%] 985 12.82%
Intervals  
residual tax levy
IRPEF surcharge IMU-TASI
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5.001 - 10.000 75% 69% 50% 65% 
10.001 - 20.000 77% 72% 58% 69% 
20.001 - 60.000 76% 72% 55% 66% 
60.001 - 100.000 70% 69% 45% 59% 
100.001 - 250.000 88% 69% 44% 68% 
>250.000  109% 102% 33% 89% 
Total 85% 84% 47% 72% 
Source: Elaborations based on the data from the municipalities’ budgets 2010-18, Ministero dell’Interno 
The decreasing of resources for the municipalities in southern Italy was not because they have 
not used fiscal levy but because their tax bases were not rich enough to raise revenues comparable to 
the decreasing transfers. As we see in the Table 6, the municipalities located in the South first have 
the residual tax levy lower than the national mean value for both IMU-TASI and IRPEF surcharge 
and, second, their actual revenues from IMU-TASI and IRPEF surcharge are lower than the national 
mean values as well.  
Table 6 – Local revenues and residual tax levy, 2017 (euro per capite and % maximum potential level of taxes revenues) 
Size category of 
municipalities  
(population) 
Revenues on 
IRPEF surcharge  
(euro per capite) 
Residual tax levy 
on  
IRPEF surcharge 
% 
Revenues on 
IMU-TASI 
 (euro per capite) 
Residual tax 
levy on  
IMU-TASI % 
<=1.000  45,6 46% 339,0 12% 
1.001 - 5.000 58,3 32% 237,3 12% 
5.001 - 10.000 70,7 22% 228,5 11% 
10.001 - 20.000 73,6 19% 226,7 10% 
20.001 - 60.000 74,3 16% 233,1 7% 
60.001 - 100.000 80,7 17% 245,0 6% 
100.001 - 250.000 92,0 16% 274,3 4% 
>250.000  115,3 10% 397,1 2% 
Location area         
North 93,5 21% 299,7 7% 
Centre 92,7 14% 314,6 3% 
South 54,4 17% 224,1 4% 
Total 79,4 18% 264,0 7% 
Source: Elaborations based on the data from F24 available 15/01/2018 
 
Summing up, it seems that under the strict fiscal constraint Italian municipalities, having power 
to tax and spend, and thus accountable to their citizenship, preferred to maintain current spending and 
historical levels of local services through high taxation. 
If the levels of local services remained almost unchanged, the main source of their financing 
changed significantly. If in 2010 the state transfers were an important part of resources to support the 
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provision of local services, in 2017 they were largely substituted with the local income at the tax rates 
driven to the maximum levels. It is important to consider that starting from 2016 the municipalities 
were banned to raise tax rates on all municipal taxes except TARI. This limitation has been relaxed 
only in 2019.  
Not all municipalities were able to raise enough tax resources in order to substitute transfers. 
The cities in the South of Italy, thought having the residual tax levy lower than the mean national 
value, managed to re-gain cumulatively only about 42% of transfer cuts compared to 72% of the 
average national level. Small municipalities comparatively raised less resources in substitutions of 
transfer cuts as well. They, however, conserve on average higher levels of the residual tax levy. After 
relaxing local tax rates in 2019, it would be interesting to observe the dynamic of their revenues. 
In this section the focus is made on current local spending and revenues because these are the 
inputs for determining the criteria for the equalization program that is analyzed in the following 
section. 
 
3. Evolving of equalization program of municipalities under fiscal consolidation  
 
 
In multilevel public finance fiscal equalization consists in transferring fiscal resources across different 
levels of government, or between jurisdictions of the same level, in order to offset differences in 
revenue raising capacity and/or in needs/cost of public service provision. 
Fiscal equalization aims at equity and efficiency, but it may be useful as a mechanism to 
stabilize public finance (Blöchliger et. al, 2007). By imposing horizontal equity across local 
jurisdictions, all households or firms are ensured to obtain comparable public services subject to 
comparable tax burden, independently from residence. Fiscal equalization can be in this way useful 
to correct for inefficiencies arising when households or firms choose their location based on fiscal 
benefit rather than productivity. Finally, fiscal equalization may support macroeconomic stabilization 
and insure local jurisdictions against asymmetric shocks that they may not be able to overcome alone. 
Equalization programs, existing both in federal and unitarian states, differ significantly across 
countries depending on institutional, political and economic setting. The main criteria to distinguish 
between a variety of programs are the direction of equalization transfers (vertical transfers from centre 
to sub-central governments and horizontal ones between sub-central governments of the same level), 
the equalization gap, the target and the approach to definition of expenditure needs/cost. 
The equalization gap can be calculated considering differences in revenue raising capacity or 
in expenditure needs of local service provision. Some programs use both criteria to define the gap. 
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The target indicates the degree to which the equalization gap is filled by means of transfers. Finally, 
if the equalization gap is calculated considering expenditure needs/costs, there can be two different 
methods for their definition: the top-down approach in which total of expenditure needs/costs is given 
a priori and distributed between local governments according to some indicator of bigger/less level 
of needs/costs, and bottom up approach in which there is no predetermined ceiling to the resources 
and where, to impose budget constraint, there are determined essential or standard or minimum levels 
of services to provide (in terms of quantity e/o quality). 
The enabling law 42/2009 in the case of municipalities provides for two types of equalization 
programs. For non-fundamental local functions, the law indicates the horizontal equalization program 
through the fund filled with municipalities’ tax resources to partially equalize fiscal capacities (tax 
revenue raising capacity at standard tax rate). With reference to fundamental local functions the law 
provides for full equalization of standard expenditure needs (full target). To this end there should be 
established a vertical fund filled with the state resources to cover possible gap between total of 
standard expenditure needs and total of standard fiscal capacities: the equalization gap is the 
difference between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.  
Regarding the approach to the definition of standard expenditure needs, the enabling law is very 
ambiguous. First, it specifies that standard expenditure needs should be determined considering the 
essential levels of benefits and standard costs, associated with the provision of local services. Thus, 
it implies that the approach to adopt should be the bottom up definition of standard needs/costs. At 
the same time, the enabling laws specifies that total municipalities’ fiscal transfers should not exceed 
the «historical» level of the central government’s transfers to the municipalities and the equalization 
should produce no additional costs for the national budget, which seems to indicate that the approach 
to adopt should of top down type. The ambiguousness of the enabling law 42/2009 regarding the 
standard expenditure needs is probably the main reason why the equalization program shaped under 
the fiscal consolidation (2010-15) and applied to the municipalities between 2015-19 is completely 
horizontal, not ensuring total equalization of standard expenditure needs. The essential levels of 
benefits, which can be useful to overcome this ambiguousness, have not been meanwhile defined.  
In 2011, the decree (D.lgs 216/2011), in implementation of the enabling law, has defined the 
set of fundamental functions of municipalities including administration services, local police, urban 
services such as street cleaning and waste management, maintaining of school premises and auxiliary 
services to education, social services, local viability and transport. The decree further lays down 
guiding criteria to carry forward into the definition of standard needs such as: periodic collection of 
data from local governments through questionnaires, development of economic models suited to 
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better describe and predict costs of local services provision on which base to determine expenditure 
needs, periodical updating of data and methodology. 
The decree remains ambiguous as to the definition of essential levels of benefits. It first states 
that standard needs should be considered a benchmark for financing fundamental functions and 
essential levels of benefits implying that there might be fundamental functions to which no essential 
levels of benefits correspond and vice versa. The decree then proceeds indicating that until the 
definition of essential levels, the existing standards, provided by the state laws, should be considered 
as essential to guarantee though standard expenditure needs. This provision opened the room for 
defining standard needs in the absence of essential levels of benefits consolidating the top-down 
approach. Besides it, where standards, provided by the state law, were missing, given the precedent, 
the benchmark levels to guarantee through standard expenditure needs have become historical levels 
of local service provision.  
In 2012, the first questionnaires were sent to municipalities to collect data on local services 
provision which together with budget data and information about local costs and prices should 
constitute the basis for the determination of standard needs24. The process of gathering the data and 
elaborating the methodological approach lasted almost three years and the first standard expenditure 
needs have been approved in 201425.  
The methodology adopted for expenditure needs of municipalities is the regression cost base 
approach (RCA)26. It consists in the regression analysis of the municipalities’ current spending using 
a big variety of variables in order to specify models which better describe spending or cost patten of 
local services provision. There are serious concerns related to this approach as it involves a big 
amount of technical discretion. The value of coefficients of cost drivers and, consequently, standard 
needs depend crucially on the specification of economic model, on the choice of estimator and of 
sample for regression (Brosio, 2019). All these decisions are technical and subtracted from political 
debate which renders the whole process not transparent.  
The analysis in this section does not, however, aim to discuss the critical issues related to the 
methodology of standard needs but to shed light on how the fiscal consolidation (2010-15) 
contributed to shape some of their traits and render equalization program targeting fundamental 
functions totally horizontal.  
 
24
 The D.lgs 216/2010 invested Sose, the company fully participated by Treasury and Bank of Italy, with collaboration of IFEL, the 
Institute affiliated to the association of Italian municipalities, to compute standard need and costs. 
25The D.lgs 216/2010 provides that standard needs and costs to be updated regularly. 
26
 For the review on the Regression cost-based approach see OECD (1981), Dafflon and Mishler (2007), Reschovsky (2007).  
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The first standard expenditure needs were derived through regression analysis from the 
distribution of local spending in 2009-10 and equal to about 38euro billions27.  
By the time of completing the elaborations, the state transfers to municipalities have declined 
by about 8,5euro billions through the transfer cuts (see Table 1). According to the laws providing for 
the transfers cuts, they regarded not only the transfers of the FSR/FSC but the equalization transfers 
as well. Thus, even before the equalization fund was actually instituted, its transfers had been already 
reduced by 8,5euro billions.  
In 2014, the vertical component of the FSC, i.e. the difference between the total fund resources 
and the total standard income IMU-TASI, was scarcely equal to 1.09euro billions and there were 
intentions to further reduce it given that in the end of the year the Budget law for 2015 provided for 
another transfer cut of 1.2euro billions. 
Furthermore, in 2014, even if standard fiscal capacities had not been yet determined, it was 
clear that the revenue raising capacity of municipalities (netted for the tax levy) would not be enough 
to cover the expenditure needs (38euro billions). As it was observed in the previous sections, the 
transfer cuts were partially substituted with tax levy. In fact, when in 2015 the fiscal capacities were 
finally approved (Decreto del Ministro dell'Economia e delle Finanze n. 11/2015), they equalled 
28euro billions. 
Given the mandate of the enabling law 42/2009 that the equalization program should not result 
in additional costs for the national budget, considered the fact that the historical level of local service 
provision has been mainly maintained (incorporated in standard expenditure needs) at cost of high 
level of tax levy (not incorporated in fiscal capacities) and finally taking in consideration that the 
essential levels of benefits have not been determined to constrain the expenditure needs, the latter 
ones have been transformed from monetary values into indicators of distribution (coefficienti di 
riparto). Such indicators of distribution could apply to whatever quantity of resources.  
It exactly what happened in 2015, when a part of the FSC transfers was calculated to equalize 
the gap between new standard resources and fiscal capacities28 where the new standard resources 
were calculated applying the indicators of distribution of needs to the total of fiscal standard 
capacities.  
 
27 It is important to consider that the fundamental functions include waste management service which total spending and expenditure 
needs amount to about 8euro billions and which are not be considered for equalization. 
28
 For more detailed information of the equalization program within FSC starting from 2015 see IFEL (2016), Brugnano 
et al. (2017), UPB (2017).  
 
20 
 
The Budget law for 2015 (Legge di stabilità n.190/2014) providing for the equalization program 
in the FSC explicitly associated it with the implementation of enabling law 42/2009 despite many 
contradictions. The first refer to the fact that in the new system the standard expenditure needs lost 
their key role of benchmark for financing fundamental functions of municipalities becoming mere 
indicators of distribution, while such role was assigned to the fiscal capacities whose total sum 
determines the quantity of resources. The second group of contradictions regard missing essential 
levels of benefits whose definition would necessarily shed light on what to be considered as standard 
level of local service provision. The difference between the standard expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity, if both netted for the waste management service, becomes very similar to the quantity of 
resources that municipalities managed to regain substituting transfer with fiscal levy (see Table 3 
Local tax revenues 2010-17). The levels of services provided through autonomous fiscal levy cannot 
serve as benchmark for equalization: or the state provides additional resources to render them 
standard or calibrate standards to the levels that can be sustained with local standard tax levy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
With the equalization program for municipalities in course between 2015-19, many contradictions 
emerged. Seemingly nobody is fully satisfied with the equalization program on which so many 
expectations were put. The municipalities losing from the program complain about losing too much 
considered the transfer cuts that they have already had, those who benefit argue that they do not 
benefit enough to recover after a long period of fiscal consolidation. Independent institution as UPB 
argued (Nota n.1/2017) the equalization program, underpinned with the current methodology for 
standard needs and fiscal capacities, contributes to maintain status quo and the existing gaps in the 
provision of local services. 
Given the contrasts between different stakeholders, the Budget law 2019 (law n.145/2018) 
blocked for a year the gradual transition to full application of the equalization fund advocating for an 
inquire on the equalization program correspondence to the mandate of the enabling law 42/2009 and 
on the reasons why the essential levels of benefits have not been determined yet.  
The mandate to produce the report on the implementation of the law 42/2009 was given to the 
technical authority as the Commission for the elaboration of standard needs (Commissione tecnica 
per i fabbisogni standard). Thought the report has not been produced yet, it appears evident that 
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solutions cannot be worked out through adjustments to the existing methodology of expenditure needs 
and fiscal capacities, but should consist in revising of the chaotic implementation of fiscal federalism: 
The original design should be reconciled with the current setting of public finance and political 
agenda. The definitions of essential levels of benefits, involving all political forces and local 
governments, might be an opportunity in this sense. 
The fact that the essential levels of benefit have never been defined after the enabling law was 
approved in 2009 does not seem accidental. Since the municipalities have reduced the current 
expenditure less compared with the transfer cuts and raised the resources through tax levy, what is 
being defined as standard according to the current expenditure needs in monetary terms cannot be 
considered standard. To recognize that the average of historical level of local service provision cannot 
be considered any more standard may be very costly in terms of political consensus. The 
ambiguousness of the enabling law 42/2009 and the unwillingness to assume political responsibility 
in order to resolve the problem seem to be among the main reasons why the equalization program 
makes ‘unhappy’ all stakeholders. 
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